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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of local politics and government structure on the allocation of 
publicly subsidized (SUS) health services across counties in Brazil, and on the probability that 
uninsured individuals who require medical attention actually receive access to those health 
services.  Higher per capita levels of SUS doctors, nurses and clinic rooms increase the 
probability that an uninsured individual gains access to health services when he or she seeks it.    
The per capita provision of doctors, nurses and clinics is greater in counties with a popular local 
leader and in counties where the county mayor and state governor are politically aligned.  They 
also rise with political participation, income inequality, and the percentage of votes going to 
leftist candidates. Administrative decentralization of health services to the county decreases 
provision levels and reduces access to services by the uninsured unless it is accompanied by good 
local governance.  
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1.  Introduction 
  In developing countries, health care is often subsidized by the government.  This 
occurs in part because of the positive externalities associated with disease control, but 
also to redistribute income and to assure that the poor receive at least some minimum 
level of health services.  A notable example is Brazil’s “Unified and Decentralized 
Healthcare System” (SUS), established in 1988 with the goal of providing access to 
health care for all citizens, regardless of income.  Financed by transfers from the federal 
government, as well as contributions from states and counties, the SUS is the main source 
of medical treatment for the poor.   
This paper addresses two questions that are essential to evaluating the success of 
public health care provision:  (1) How do politics and government structure influence the 
distribution of public health services—doctors, nurses and clinics—across counties?  (2) 
How do politics and the decentralization of public health services affect the likelihood 
that the poor and the uninsured actually receive health care?  We answer the first question 
by estimating models to explain variation in the numbers of public clinics, doctors and 
nurses per capita across counties (municipios) in Brazil in 1998.  We also examine the 
determinants of changes to county health budgets following local elections.  To answer 
the second question we use a large household survey (the 1998 Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD)) to see whether people without private health insurance 
who rely on publicly financed health care are more likely to receive medical attention in 
counties with more public clinics and health care workers per capita.  Because 
decentralization in the administration of health services may affect their placement within   2
a county and the types of services offered, we also examine the impact of decentralization 
variables on the likelihood that the uninsured receive medical care.   
We use a probabilistic voting model (Grossman and Helpman 2001; Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2001) to provide a theoretical foundation for the provision of public health 
care.  Two parties compete for the votes of citizens who favor public provision of health 
care (e.g., the uninsured) and those who do not (e.g., the insured).  In a voting 
equilibrium, the level of public health care provided reflects the shares of the two groups 
of citizens in the voting population, and is limited by the size of the public budget. 
The model has four implications for the provision of public health care: (1) 
Provision should increase with average income in a county since this raises the level of 
tax revenues in the public budget constraint; (2) If the uninsured receive greater utility 
from public health care than the insured, one should expect to see higher levels of public 
health care in counties with a greater share of uninsured persons, ceteris paribus; (3) 
Since what matters for public goods provision is the share of each group in the population 
of voters, areas in which a higher percentage of the uninsured vote should receive a 
higher level of public health care services, ceteris paribus (4) Provision of public health 
care should be greater in counties that are able, through negotiations with the state and 
federal governments, to receive higher grants (transfers) for health care.  The model thus 
implies that the political power of local officials and their influence with state and federal 
officials should increase the public provision of health care, as should higher voter 
turnout by persons favoring publicly provided health care.  We find empirical support for 
both effects.     3
The extent to which decisions regarding public health are decentralized—i.e., 
made at the local rather than at the state level—is also likely to play a role in the amount 
of health services provided and where they are located within the county.  The traditional 
arguments in favor of decentralization are that (a) local governments are likely to be more 
responsive to local preferences than are state governments (Oates 1972; Besley and Coate 
1999), and (b) decentralization promotes government accountability (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2000).  This should improve the targeting of public health services (e.g., 
where clinics are located or the types of services offered), and may also improve their 
delivery to people that need them most.   
We model decentralization in the provision of health services as a variable that 
affects the effective level of health services provided by a given vector of health care 
inputs (doctors, nurses, clinic consultation rooms).  The theoretical impact of 
decentralization on the quantity of health care inputs chosen is ambiguous, and we find 
that decentralization of authority over public health care by itself does not affect the level 
of health care personnel and clinics provided.  Counties with full authority over health 
care provision that also have a governance plan do, however, provide more health care 
services per capita than decentralized counties that lack a governance plan.  We also find 
that decentralized counties receive much larger increases in their health budgets 
following a local election than their state-run counterparts.  
The effective level of health services per capita depends not only on the amount 
of health inputs provided, but also on their placement.  We examine the impact of 
doctors, nurses and clinics as well as other factors that may affect where such inputs are 
located—on the probability that an uninsured person both sought and received health care   4
when ill.  We find that households living in counties with more public health service 
provision are more likely to be able to see a health professional when they need to.  The 
impact of decentralization depends on the governance capacity of the county.  The 
probability of an uninsured individual receiving medical attention is no higher in counties 
with full control over the allocation of health care resources than in counties with only 
partial control.  However, the probability of receiving attention is lower under 
decentralization if the county does not have a governance plan.   
By creating county level indicators of political participation, competition and 
connections, and examining their impacts on local public service provision and 
individuals’ access to health care, this paper contributes to a well developed literature on 
the impact of democracy on economic performance (e.g. Rodrik 2000).  In particular, we 
find that political patronage and participation matter.  Citizens can attract better public 
services by going to the polls to effectively threaten politicians, while local politicians 
can provide their constituents better services if they are more “connected” to state 
legislators.  We also add to the literature on decentralization by clarifying the 
relationships that link governance, decentralization and public service provision. 
Decentralization is unlikely to result in better service delivery unless it is accompanied by 
the required governing capacity. 
The next section discusses the administrative structure of the health care system in 
Brazil and recent reforms.  Section 3 presents our theoretical model.  In section 4 we 
demonstrate that the number of SUS doctors, nurses and clinic rooms in a county 
increases the chance that an uninsured person receives medical attention when he needs   5
it.  Models to explain variation in the number of SUS doctors, nurses and clinics across 
countries are presented in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Health Care System in Brazil 
Under the military regime (1964 to 1985), public health care provision in Brazil 
was heavily concentrated in the rich areas of the South and Southeast, with preferential 
access openly granted to certain professionals and public sector employees (Lobato 
2001).  The 1988 “Citizens’ Constitution,” which marked the new period of democratic 
rule, decreed that all citizens should have “universal and equal access to [health] actions 
and services” regardless of income or occupation (Vajda et al.1998).  To fulfill 
constitutional requirements, the “Unified and Decentralized Healthcare System” (SUS) 
was established in 1990 to make health care available free of charge to all users.  
Currently, a fully private system co-exists with SUS.  It is funded mostly through 
private health insurance plans and provides much higher quality care than the public SUS 
system (Alves and Timmins 2001).  Premiums for private insurance plans are relatively 
costly for most Brazilians, and only about 25% of the population (mostly those with 
higher incomes or with employer-provided coverage) had private health insurance in 
1998-99 (Alvarez 1998).  These individuals generally make little use of the SUS system 
unless they require highly complex health care services that private plans do not cover.  
This paper focuses on health care provision through the SUS system, which is 
publicly financed.  The following sections discuss the ownership and administration of 
facilities in the SUS system and how public health care is financed.
1  
                                                 
1 Much of the discussion of the SUS system is based on Lobato and Burlandy (2001), Lobato (2001), 
World Bank (1999) and World Bank (2003).   6
 
A. Ownership and Administration of Facilities in the SUS System 
Although the SUS system is fully publicly financed, many health care 
establishments providing SUS services are privately owned.  The remainder are federal, 
state and county facilities.  In 1999 67% of all SUS hospitals were privately owned; while 
state and county governments accounted for 8% and 23% of hospitals respectively.  In 
contrast, county governments owned 69% of clinics, while only 27% were private 
(Pesquisa Assistencia Medico Sanitaria, 1999).  
Irrespective of ownership, all SUS facilities are administered by either state or 
county governments.  The 1988 Constitution required that the administration of public 
health care provision should gradually devolve to county governments, with financial and 
technical assistance provided by the federal and state governments (Lobato and Burlandy 
2001).  Currently, each county is classified into one of the following three categories, in 
order of increasing levels of administrative decentralization: (i) Full State Management; 
(ii) Basic Assistance Management, where the county manages the provision of basic or 
primary health care,
2 and the state manages more complex types of provision; and (iii) 
Full County System Management, where the county manages the provision of basic as 
well as complex care.  A county government that wishes to attain the Basic Assistance or 
Full Management status must negotiate this with the federal government.  Full 
Management status is awarded only if the county government asks for it, and if the 
federal government judges it capable of handling this enhanced administrative role.  At 
                                                 
2 Visits to family doctors as well as some other types of clinical care are included in this category; complex 
procedures and visits to specialists are not.   7
the start of 1999, 8% of all counties had attained Full County System Management status, 
while 80% had attained Basic Assistance Management status.  
 
B. Financing of the SUS System 
About 70% of health care services provided under SUS are ultimately financed by 
transfers from the federal government, of which there are two types: those for basic 
health care and those for complex care.  County governments with either Basic 
Assistance or Full Management status administer basic care transfer funds. These 
transfers are divided into two categories: (i) “fixed” population-based transfers where the 
per capita amount transferred is the same for most counties; and (ii) various types of 
“variable” transfers for primary health programs tailored to the poor, often requiring 
additional payments or co-financing by states or counties. 
Only county governments with Full County System Management status can 
handle transfers for complex care.  These transfers are meant solely for the 
reimbursement of SUS providers for services rendered, and are subject to two constraints: 
(i) they must follow a fee-for-service schedule maintained by the federal government, 
and, (ii) there is an annual ceiling on the total amount of transfers that each sub-national 
government can disburse.  The amount of the ceiling is determined by political 
negotiations between the federal and sub-national governments.  Political factors that 
affect the nature of these negotiations thus may play a key role in determining provision 
patterns for complex care.  For example, SUS allocations may be favorable for counties 
that are politically important or politically allied to the state in some form.    8
Each state and county government managing these federal transfers imposes, in 
turn, a ceiling on transfers to each licensed SUS provider in its jurisdiction.  The 
government in charge also has the right to determine which providers qualify to 
participate in the SUS system.  The sub-national governments may supplement these 
federal transfers with their own funds, and, in the case of Full County Management, 
sometimes also from state funds.  About 30% of the payments to SUS providers come 
from sub-national government revenues.  The states and counties have taxing authority 
over land, property and transportation, and also receive ‘general purpose’ transfers from 
the federal government.   
 
3.  Theoretical Model  
In Brazil publicly financed health care is, effectively, a local public good.  The 
level of basic health care provision is chosen by the county,
3 as is the level of complex 
health care services in the case of full decentralization (Full System Management).  
Because county officials in Brazil are democratically elected, it is natural to use a voting 
model of public goods provision as a framework for our empirical analysis.  We adapt the 
two-party strategic voting model outlined in Grossman and Helpman (2001) for this 
purpose.   
The population of each county is normalized to 1.  A fraction  r  of the county 
population are “rich”, while the remaining (1-r) are “poor”.  Our aim here is to draw a 
distinction between two classes of people who differentially benefit from public health 
services.  We could also characterize the two groups as “insured” and “uninsured.”  
                                                 
3 This is true for 88% of counties, i.e., those who have attained Basic Assistance or Full System 
Management status.   9
Throughout, the superscript  u  represents the “upper” income group, and the superscript  
l  the “lower” income group.  y
g, g = u,l, denotes the income of each group.  All 
individuals within an income group have identical incomes. 
Public revenues for the county come from two sources: Transfers from the state 
government, T, which are determined through political negotiations between the county 
and the state, and local tax revenues from taxing the incomes of the rich and the poor at a 
common rate  t.   These revenues are used solely to finance public health services.  Each 
unit of “effective health service per capita” is denoted  h,
 4 and it is delivered at a per-unit 
cost  p.   The public budget constraint is thus: 
        0 ) 1 ( = ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + − + h p y r t y r t T
u l  (1) 
  Two parties, denoted A and B, have fixed positions on a set of issues, and choose 
the amount of effective health service (h) and tax rate (t) to offer,  in order to compete for 
the votes of both rich and poor households.  The parties can credibly commit to carry out 
their platforms in the event that they win the election.  Each voter recognizes that his vote 
will slightly increase the subjective probability that the party he has chosen will win the 
election.  His dominant strategy is to vote for the party he prefers, since this slightly 
raises his expected welfare.  We assume that all rich people vote, while a fraction  v of 
the poor (uninsured) vote.
5   
  Voters receive utility  ( ) c h W
g ,  from the public health service (h) and a private 
consumption good, c.  Since all after-tax income is spent on  c, the utility of a voter in 
                                                 
4 This “effective health service” should be interpreted as the actual service received by the consumer. It 
incorporates not just the amount of services offered (e.g. the number of clinics), but also their placement 
within a county and the types of procedures offered at each location.  h is of course a function of health 
inputs such as clinics, doctors and nurses.    
5 This assumption is not crucial to the results, but it reflects empirical observations about voting patterns in 
Brazil.  Voting is compulsory in Brazil; however people who are less likely to have insurance (due to a lack 
of formal sector work), are also more likely to escape being fined if they do not vote.    10
group  g  is given by:  ( ) ) 1 ( , t y h W
g g − .  W
g  is assumed to be increasing and concave in 
both arguments, and additively separable in the two arguments.  We expect 




h W W , which means that the poor (uninsured) enjoy greater marginal benefits 
from public health services than do the rich.  Each voter’s welfare from voting for a 
particular party depends on the (h, t) combination offered by that party as well as his 
preferences over the fixed (e.g. ideological) positions of that party.  A person  i  in 
income group  g  votes for party A over party B if: 
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ε.i  is the individual-specific preference for the fixed platforms of each party, and  δ  is the 
relative weight placed on such ideological considerations. If the relative ideological 
preference of a voter for party A over party B, ) ( Bi Ai ε ε − , is distributed uniformly over 
the interval [ ] 2
1 , 2
1 − , then the expected number of votes for party A is given by:  
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  Each party proposes a tax rate (tA or tB) and an amount of effective public health 
service (per capita) to be delivered (hA or hB) to maximize its chances of winning the 
election (EVA or EVB), given the (h,t) choice of the other party, and subject to the public 
budget constraint.  The first order condition for  h  from the Lagrangian of this 

















λ , where  λ  is the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the public budget constraint.  This states that the party’s choice 
of  h  equates the weighted marginal utility of the two groups to the marginal cost of 
provision, where the weights are the proportions of each group in the voting population.     11
  It is instructive to substitute an expression for  hA  in terms of  tA  from the budget 
constraint (1) into party A’s maximand (3), and solve the resulting one-variable 
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r ) 1 ( ) 1 (  (4) 
where 
l u y r ry y ) 1 ( − + = , is the population-weighted average income.  Equation (4) 
shows that party A chooses h to equate the weighted marginal utility of h to its weighted 
marginal tax cost, where the weights are the proportion of voters in each group.  Party 
B’s maximization problem and first-order conditions are identical, which implies that in 
the unique Nash equilibrium, both parties offer the same tax–public health service policy. 
The  h  that emerges in equilibrium is the same regardless of which party wins the 
election.   
  By totally differentiating (4), it is possible to examine the impacts of changes in 
the parameters of the model on the quantity of effective per capita health care (h) 
delivered in equilibrium.  For example, an increase in  r  (proportion of people who are 
rich) has an ambiguous effect on  h: 
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hh W r v rW y p − + − .)  The first term on the 
RHS of (5) is the net marginal benefit of health services to the rich (net of consumption 
costs), while the second term is net marginal benefits of h to the poor multiplied by their 
voting rate.  If the net marginal benefits of public health accruing to the poor are 
sufficiently larger than those accruing to the rich, then the sum of the first two terms is 
negative, which causes h to decrease with r.  This is an effect of party platforms: with an 
increase in the proportion of rich people in the population, the (h,t) combination offered 
by each party caters more to the preferences of the rich segment of the population.  The 
positive last term is due to a relaxation of the public budget constraint.  An increase in  r  
raises average incomes and tax revenues, and the parties can afford to offer a larger 
amount of public health care.   
  The two distinct and opposite impacts of an increase in  r  on  h  are (1) the effect 
of a changing composition of the voting population, which alters policy in favor of the 
rich, and (2) the effect of increasing average income, which leads to greater public 
service delivery.  In our empirical work, we seek to distinguish these two effects by 
measuring the proportion of poor/uninsured in the population separately from average 
incomes.   Holding the proportion poor constant, the model predicts that an increase in 
average income should have a positive impact on the amount of effective health care (per 
capita) delivered by the county.  And, holding average income constant, an increase in 
the proportion of poor/uninsured in the population should also have a positive impact. 
  The model predicts that an increase in the voting rate of the poor (v) will increase 
public health care provision as long as the marginal benefits to the poor of an extra dollar 
of tax (in terms of the extra health services that tax dollar will provide) exceed its   13













− = .  An increase in  v  causes 
politicians to alter policy in favor of poor people’s preferences, and if the poor prefer that 
tax rates be raised to fund more public health care, then that is what will happen.  
  Finally, the effect of greater transfers from the state to the county (T) is 
straightforward: it simply relaxes the public budget constraint and allows the political 
parties to offer more public health care for any given level of tax revenues.  For every 
extra dollar that the county is able to bring in from the state through the inter-
governmental political negotiations process, h  increases by 1/p units.     
  The effective level of health care per capita,  h, is unobservable.  What we can 
observe are the levels of inputs—doctors, nurses and clinics—used to produce health 
care.  Suppose that health services per capita are produced under constant returns to scale. 
The amount of effective health care per capita is, however, dependent on the placement 
of health inputs vis-à-vis the population, as well as on how efficiently these inputs are 
managed.  We therefore assume that  h  is a function of doctors, nurses and clinics (or 
clinic rooms) per capita, as well as descriptors of the geographic distribution of the 
population (P) and measures of the decentralization of health care (d): 
h =  f(D, N, C; P,d)                                                                              (6)              
 Once    h  is determined as an outcome of the political process, we assume that 
health care inputs are chosen to minimize the cost of achieving  h.  This implies that 
doctors, nurses and clinics per capita will depend on the factors affecting  h   in the voting 
model, as well as on measures of decentralization and the geographic distribution of the 
population, which affect the amount of effective health care provided by a given vector of 
health inputs.  In our empirical models, we explain variation in health care inputs across   14
counties as a function of the determinants of  h  from the voting model, as well as 
variables  P  and  d.   
 
4.  The Impact of SUS Doctors, Nurses and Clinics on Access to Public Health Care 
We estimate the impact of political variables and government structure on access 
to health care in two stages.  First we establish that the number of doctors, nurses and 
clinic rooms in SUS facilities increase the probability of an uninsured person receiving 
health care when he needs it.  Having demonstrated that public health care inputs matter, 
in section 5 we explain variation in the level of public health inputs—SUS doctors, 
nurses and clinics (or clinic rooms) per capita—across counties.  This section describes 
the variables included in the model of access to health care and presents our results.   
  A.  A Model of Access to Health Care 
Our model of access to health care explains whether or not an individual 
dependent on the SUS had adequate access to health care in 1998.  The data are obtained 
from a special health module of the 1998 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios 
(PNAD), a survey of 344,886 individuals from 112,434 households.
6  Survey respondents 
were asked whether they had a health problem during the previous two weeks that 
required medical attention. Our sample consists of individuals who answered “yes” to 
this question and who did not have private health insurance, i.e., who were likely to use 
the SUS system.  A subset of these individuals reported that they either were not able to 
obtain treatment when they sought it (e.g., because the doctor was not available when 
they visited the health facility) or that they did not bother seeking treatment because of 
difficulty accessing a health facility (e.g., it was too far away). These individuals are 
                                                 
6 The survey is representative of all of Brazil except for certain rural areas in the North.   15
classified as not having access to health care.  [Details on the relevant survey questions 
and responses are provided in the Data Appendix.]   Of the 33,541 individuals in our 
sample, 24% (8,077) did not have adequate access to health care; 76% did.  
The probability that an individual who uses the SUS has access to health care, as 
defined above, depends on the level of effective health care provided (equation (6) 
above), but also on the effort that the individual invests in seeking health care.  This is 
likely to depend on the nature and severity of his illness. We include dummy variables 
describing the nature of the individual’s illness, including diarrhea, respiratory disease 
and diabetes.  For two of these conditions—diarrhea and respiratory disease—an 
interaction term with the individual’s age is included as a separate variable, to account for 
the fact that these diseases can be much more harmful in children than in adults.  Severity 
of the illness is captured by the number of days within the two-week period when the 
individual could not function properly due to the illness.  Other individual and household 
level controls include measures of per capita household income, age, sex, household size, 
education level and race dummies. 
B.   Factors Affecting Effective Health Care 
1.  Public Health Inputs 
We posit that the level of effective health care per capita provided by the SUS 
system depends on the number of SUS doctors, nurses and clinics, as well as on factors 
affecting the placement of these inputs, such as decentralization in health care 
administration.  The public health inputs included in the model (each expressed per 1,000 
residents) are: the number of doctors (including specialists), nurses (including “nursing 
auxiliaries” and “nursing technicians”), and clinic consultation rooms in the SUS   16
system.
7  Clinics are defined as all units providing medical care without inpatient 
facilities (pharmacies and facilities providing purely diagnostic services, such as 
laboratories, are not included).
8  We also include measures of private health inputs—the 
number of private doctors, nurses and clinic rooms per capita—since the uninsured may 
elect to use these services. 
2.  Variables Influencing the Effectiveness of Public Health Inputs 
The effective level of public health care received by residents of a county for a 
given per capita number of doctors, nurses or clinics, depends on the geographic 
distribution of these services within the county.  Other things equal, a given number of 
doctors per person is likely to be less effective the more dispersed is the population.  
Geographic controls added to capture this phenomenon include (i) the proportion of 
county residents living in urban areas; (ii) population density; and (iii) a dummy for 
counties officially classified as belonging to a major metropolitan area.  
The effective level of public health care is also likely to be affected by the 
decentralization of health care administration.  Section 2 highlighted the fact that the 
government—state or local—in charge of the provision of complex health services plays 
a key role in determining funding allocations and outcomes.  For this reason, our measure 
of decentralization is a dummy variable for counties where the management of both basic 
and complex care provision has been decentralized to county governments.  No 
differentiation is made between counties where the management of only basic care 
                                                 
7  These data were obtained from were obtained from the Pesquisa Assistencia Medico-Sanitaria, a survey 
of all health facilities in Brazil conducted in 1999.  
8 We do not use hospitals or hospital beds as provision measures because hospitals are “lumpy” units that 
are located in a limited number of counties.  They are meant to serve residents from a fairly large 
geographical area that includes several counties.  Thus, the county is not the appropriate unit of analysis.   
   17
provision has been decentralized and those under Full State Management.  Unlike 
decentralization measures used in most of the literature, which are based on the relative 
sizes of the state versus local government budgets, we construct our measure based on 
clear information about the government that is in charge of administering health services 
and regulating health care providers.  According to our definition, 30% of the 752 
counties in the PNAD sample are decentralized. 
Which counties the government chooses to decentralize is endogenous, since 
counties deemed more administratively capable may be decentralized first.  Therefore, 
simply comparing outcomes across decentralized and state-administered counties would 
not allow us to infer anything causal about the impact of decentralization on service 
delivery.  For this reason, we use data on the quality of governance to compare outcomes 
across three groups of counties: (1) decentralized counties with good governance, (2) 
decentralized counties without good governance, and (3) non-decentralized (state-
administered) counties.   
Our measures of governance are derived from the Pesquisa de Informações 
Basicas Municipais, a questionnaire on planning capacity, management ability and 
organizational structure that was administered to all Brazilian counties in 1999. One 
question asks whether the county has a plan or set of directives for governing, and the 
length of time that such a directive has been in effect.  More specifically, this is defined 
as an “explicit set of objectives and general line of actions oriented towards local 
development and improving residents’ living conditions.”  Our “good governance” 
measure indicates whether the answer to this question is “Yes.”  According to this 
definition, 53% of our PNAD sample survey respondents live in counties that have “good   18
governance.”  Although this fraction varies somewhat between decentralized and non-
decentralized counties (60% and 50% respectively), there is only a weak positive 
correlation (+0.11) between the decentralization and governance quality indicators.
9 
C.  Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables in our access to health care 
equation.  The 33,541 persons in our sample live in 752 of the 793 counties sampled in 
the 1998 PNAD survey.
10  Compared to all counties in Brazil, the 752 PNAD counties 
are more urbanized and have more SUS doctors and nurses, but fewer clinic consultation 
rooms, per thousand residents.  Health care is fully decentralized in a higher percentage 
of these counties than in Brazil as a whole.  
Seventy-six percent of the uninsured persons in the PNAD who were ill in the two 
weeks prior to the survey both sought and obtained medical attention.  Comparing sample 
means across survey respondents who report that they did receive medical attention when 
required with those who did not, people who have health care access are on average a 
little younger, are from smaller households and are more likely to be female, although 
these differences are not statistically significant.  People with access enjoy significantly 
higher household per capita income, are more likely to be educated, white and urban, and 
were seeking treatment for an illness of longer duration.   
                                                 
9 We constructed two alternative governance measures based on two other survey questions: (i) whether the 
county had a “strategic plan”, or a specific plan laying out “strategies for sustainable socioeconomic 
development”, and (ii) whether it had a “community health council”—a body separate from the government 
consisting of public officials and members of civil society—that specifically oversaw health provision 
policy in the county.  It was specified that the health council had to be more than just advisory in nature; it 
had to have “deliberative” powers, i.e. some control over policies, decisions and funding. Approximately 
62% of our survey respondents live in counties that have health councils, while only 15% live in counties 
that have a strategic plan.  
10 These counties are distributed across all states except Brasilia.  All regressions reported in this paper 
include state dummies to ensure that the results are not driven by a state-level omitted factor.   19
  Table 2 reports the results of estimating a logit model to explain whether an 
individual obtained health care when ill as a function of individual and household 
characteristics, measures of public and private doctors and nurses and clinic consultation 
rooms (per capita), geographic variables and measures of decentralization and good 
governance. The coefficients of individual characteristics indicate that females, whites, 
richer and better educated people (the omitted education category is less than primary 
education) are significantly more likely to have sought and received health care when ill.  
Women are 3.7 percentage points more likely to seek and receive attention than men, and 
a person with a college education is 7.2 percentage points more likely to seek and receive 
attention than a person with a less than primary school education.  For every R$160 
increase in per-capita monthly household income, the probability of receiving medical 
attention increases by 6.3 percentage points.   
The duration and nature of illness also influence the probability of seeking and 
receiving health care.  An additional day of illness increases the probability of seeking 
health care by 1 percentage point.  Curiously, people with back/spine problems, arthritis 
and kidney disease are less likely, while people with heart/blood pressure problems and 
diabetes are more likely, to report seeking and receiving treatment when compared to 
individuals not suffering from any chronic afflictions. 
Measures of the supply of public (SUS) health service inputs have strong positive 
impacts on individual access. An increase in SUS doctors by 1 per 1,000 increases the 
probability of receiving health care by 5 percentage points, while an increase in clinic 
consultation rooms by 1 per thousand residents leads to a 3  percentage point increase in 
the probability that individuals will receive treatment when required.  Increases in the   20
non-SUS private provision of health professionals or clinics have no statistically 
significant effect on access. This is not surprising, since our sample consists only of 
uninsured individuals who typically would not seek private health care. 
  Measures of the spatial distribution of population are not significant here; 
however, respondents living in urban areas are almost 10 percentage points more likely to 
seek and receive health care than those in rural areas.  Decentralization of service 
delivery actually reduces the chances of receiving health care if it is not accompanied by 
good governing capacity.  Individuals living in decentralized counties that lack the 
governing capacity are 4.6 percentage points less likely to be treated by a health 
professional than individuals living in counties where the administration of SUS is still 
under state control.  On the other hand, individuals in decentralized counties with a 
governance plan are no more likely to report adequate access compared to individuals in 
counties where health care is administered by the state.
11  The access probability is over 5 
percentage points higher in decentralized counties with a governance plan than in 
decentralized counties without the governance plan, and this difference is statistically 
significant.  
 
5.   Why Do SUS Doctors, Nurses and Clinics Vary Across Counties? 
Having demonstrated that health care inputs and the decentralization of health 
care administration increase the probability of an uninsured person having access to 
health care, we now attempt to explain variation in health care inputs across counties.  In 
                                                 
11 When we replace the governance plan measure with the two alternative indicators of governance 
(whether the county has a strategic plan and whether it has a health policy council), we continue to observe 
that living in a decentralized county without the requisite governing capacity has a significant negative 
impact on access.   21
estimating these equations we use data for 4,338 counties for 1998.  Variation in doctors, 
nurses and clinics across counties should depend on the variables  P  and d, and also on 
the determinants of  h  in the voting model of section 3.  Although one might suspect that 
current levels of health care inputs were determined by historic factors that happen to be 
correlated with current political variables, there is some margin for public SUS inputs to 
actually respond to current political conditions.  This is because SUS contracts out a large 
portion of its services to private facilities, which makes the provision of clinics and 
healthcare workers somewhat elastic, as private providers can be moved in and out of the 
SUS system.  The fact that we exploit the cross-sectional variation in health inputs may 
lead to concerns that political outcomes whose effects on service delivery we intend to 
study are themselves influenced by the quality of health services delivered.  We use data 
on changes in county health budgets subsequent to elections to deal with such concerns. 
  A.  Voter Preferences and Incomes 
In the model of section 3, the amount of public health care provided depends on 
the size of the public budget constraint and on the distribution of voter preferences within 
the community.  Because public health care is financed in part out of local tax revenues, 
we expect the quantity of health services provided to increase with per capita income in 
the county ( y ).  It should also increase with the size of transfers received from state and 
federal governments.  These may depend on political factors (e.g., whether the mayor of 
the county is of the same party as the governor of the state) which are discussed more 
fully below.  
We assume that preferences for publicly provided health care should increase 
with the percentage of uninsured people in the county.  This should be correlated with the   22
percentage of households falling below a given income level.  Holding mean income 
constant, the percentage of households below a given income threshold is increasing in 
the Gini coefficient for the county.   Other variables that might be correlated with the 
demand for public health care include the percentage of households living in slums and 
the racial composition of the population (e.g., the percentage of population that is 
indigenous, and the percentage of the population that is non-white). 
Voters’ desires for redistribution may also play a role in determining outcomes. If 
this desire is strong and if governments respond accordingly, provision levels and 
access—especially for the poor—may be higher. Our (albeit imperfect) measure for this 
is the proportion of county residents who voted for either of the two clearly left-leaning 
candidates in the 1998 Presidential elections - Lula and Ciro Gomes.
12  These two 
candidates accounted for about 35% of the votes on average across the sample counties.  
According to the model of section 3, the amount of public health care provided 
depends not only the proportion of households in a county that favor public health care, 
but on the proportion of voters that do.  Although by law voting is compulsory for 
literates in all elections, in practice the penalties for non-compliance are not large, and 
average voter turnout (77% in the 1996 elections) is significantly less than 100%. Our 
proxy for political participation by persons favoring public health care (ν) is the 
proportion of residents in each county who voted in the 1996 county elections.  Because 
people employed in the informal sector are more likely to be able to escape the penalty 
for not voting, variation in participation rates is likely a result of variation in the voting 
                                                 
12 Lula—Brazil’s current president—has been a key figure in the Worker’s Party, a party that has fashioned 
itself as left-leaning. Aside from Lula, the only candidate in the 1998 Presidential elections who ran on a 
clearly leftist platform was Ciro Gomes, of the ex-communist Popular Socialist Party.     23
rate of those without formal sector jobs (the segment of the population more likely to use 
SUS services).   
It is of course possible that our taste variables affect public health care through 
other routes.  In a regression of federal SUS transfers to counties that is reported in 
appendix table A.1, we indeed find a positive relationship between transfers (T) and the 
Gini coefficient, and between transfers and the percentage of votes cast for a left-leaning 
candidate, suggesting that these variables may affect public health care through both 
tastes and transfers.
13  This suggests that our models to explain health care inputs should 
be interpreted as reduced-form models. 
It is also the case that political participation may capture more than support for 
public health care.  A regression of the fraction of persons who voted in the 1996 on 
covariates (see Table A.1) suggests that political participation is highly correlated with 
education.  To control for the fact that variation in the voting rate may reflect the 
proportion of the population that is illiterate, we also include this variable in some 
empirical models. 
B.  Factors Affecting Transfers  
Political factors are likely to play a key role in determining the size of transfers to 
counties from the state and federal governments.  SUS allocations and other transfers 
may be favorable for counties that are politically important or that have close ties to the 
state capital (Lima 2002). These counties may also be favored in other ways, such as 
through special training programs, preferential access to the services of medical staff, and 
better state-owned health care facilities located in the county.  We include four variables 
                                                 
13 Surprisingly, the political participation in the 1996 mayoral election is negatively associated with 
transfers.    24
as proxies for political connections: (1) the distance of each county from the state capital; 
(2) a measure of ‘political alliance’ indicating whether the mayor of the county elected in 
1996 and the state governor elected in 1994 were from the same party;
14 (3) the winner’s 
vote share in the 1996 mayoral election; and (4) the product of the winner’s vote share 
and whether the mayor and state governor are from the same political party.  The 
winner’s vote share is included because locally elected officials with a strong popularity 
base possibly have greater political capital to expend in their negotiations with state 
legislators over the size of their health budget.  It is important for state politicians to keep 
strong local leaders happy.  We interact this measure with the ‘political alliance’ variable, 
since we expect the effect of a popular local politician on funds transfers to be stronger 
when the state and county politicians are in a coalition. 
In appendix table A.1, only the ‘political alliance’ variable turns out to be a 
statistically significant determinant of federal per-capita SUS transfers to counties.  We 
still choose to include all four variables as potential determinants of health inputs because 
(a) there may be ways other than larger transfers through which politically important or 
politically aligned counties are favored by upper-level governments and (b) in a reduced-
form empirical specification, there may be other mechanisms through which these 
variables impact the quantities of health inputs.  For example, politically important 
counties may receive a larger stock of state-owned or federal-owned hospitals and clinics, 
even if they do not receive larger flows of annual transfers.  Conversely, a large vote 
                                                 
14 This occurs in 13.6% of counties in our sample.  We do not use 1998 gubernatorial election results, 
because the new governor elected in 1998 would take office in 1999. Our dependent variables are measured 
in 1998 and 1999, and we are allowing for a time lag since we expect political actions to have a delayed 
rather than immediate impact on provision.  We also expanded the definition of the ‘political connections’ 
variable to indicate whether the state governor’s party and county mayor’s party formed a coalition in that 
state, but the qualitative results do not change under this alternative definition.   25
share for the elected mayor indicates a lack of political competition in the county, which 
may have an independent effect on public service delivery.    
   
  C.  Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the counties used to estimate our health 
care input models. Our sample consists of the 4,338 counties (out of approximately 5,000 
total) for which data on the variables in column (1) were available. The average county in 
our sample has about 1 doctor and 1.4 nursing professionals working at SUS facilities, 
and approximately 2 SUS clinic consultation rooms per thousand residents.  Average 
county per capita GDP is R$3,020.  The average Gini coefficient, 0.53, reflects the high 
degree of income inequality in the Brazilian population.  The average county is 
approximately 50% white, with 59% of the population living in urban areas, but is 
located outside of a major metropolitan area. 
  Table 3 reports equations for doctors (per capita), estimated by ordinary least 
squares.  Model (2) contains a parsimonious specification of the health input equation 
that includes only those variables that should affect  h  in the voting model of section 3. 
Model (3) adds measures of decentralization and other political variables, while model 
(4) expands the list of variables that might affect the allocation of resources in the SUS 
system.  Table 4 presents the results of estimating model (4) for three other health 
inputs—nurses, clinics, and clinic consultation rooms.  We also explain the change in the 
per-capita health budget for each county following the 1996 county mayoral elections to 
allay concerns that past provision of health services has resulted in the current popularity 
of elected officials (or similar reasons).   26
  Model (5) contains the same covariates as model (4), but allows for spatially auto-
correlated errors.  We expect some spatial autocorrelation in the cross-sectional county 
sample, since region-specific unobserved factors are likely to affect the demand for 
health services in similar ways in counties located close to one another.  When Moran’s I 
statistic (Anselin 1988) is computed to test for spatial autocorrelation in the errors in 
model (4), the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation is rejected for two forms of 
the spatial weighting matrix—one in which the neighbors of each county are defined to 
be those counties with which it shares a border, and one in which the neighbors are all 
counties within a certain radius of the county in question.  This leads us to estimate a 
spatial autoregressive errors model of the form 
) , 0 ( ~   ;           ,  
2I N λWu u u X z σ ε ε β + = + =      (7) 
using a generalized moments estimator (Kelejian and Prucha 1999).  W is a distance-
based weighting matrix, and z is a measure of per-capita health input.
15   Finally, model 
(6) studies the provision of doctors in a subset of urbanized counties to check whether our 
results hold when rural areas are excluded. 
  Table 3 presents five different specifications for the SUS doctors per capita 
equation, in order to check whether results are robust to changes in the set of conditioning 
variables, the sample, and the treatment of spatial correlation in errors.  In describing the 
results below, we will focus on model (4) for doctors, along with its analogous 
specifications for nurses, clinics and consultation rooms (models 7, 8 and 9 presented in 
table 4).  These models use the entire sample of 4,338 county observations, and control 
for the full set of conditioning variables.    
                                                 
15  It is preferable to define a county’s neighbors based on distance rather than contiguity, given the great 
variation in county area (see figure 1).  The spatial pattern in the provision of doctors is much more evident 
than in the provision of other health inputs.    27
Four results stand out.  First, voter preferences matter.  Holding per capita income 
constant, counties with a less equal distribution of income—suggesting a greater 
proportion of persons relying on the SUS—are likely to have more SUS clinic rooms, and 
especially more doctors and nurses.
16  A one standard deviation change in the Gini 
coefficient increases SUS doctors by about 4% (model 4) and nurses by about 5%.
17 
Counties where voters express greater redistributive preferences are also more likely to 
have more SUS services.   When the vote share for the two left-leaning candidates in the 
1998 Presidential election increases by one standard deviation (i.e. 14 percentage points), 
provision of doctors, nurses and clinics increase by 3.5%, 4.7% and 3.9% respectively. 
Second, the provision of SUS doctors, nurses and clinics is greater in counties 
where a higher fraction of persons who are likely to favor public health care vote.   A one 
standard deviation (or 8.6 percentage point) increase in the percentage of persons voting 
in the 1996 mayoral election increases clinics (and clinic consultation rooms) by about 
8%.  Counties with a one standard deviation larger voting rate also experience 8% larger 
increases in their health budgets subsequent to the 1996 elections.  As we argue above, 
variation in the voting rate (holding literacy constant) is likely to reflect an increase in the 
percentage of uninsured persons voting, since persons in the informal sector (who are less 
likely to be insured) are less likely to be penalized for not voting.  The impact of political 
participation on doctors stays positive in all specifications in table 3, but gets smaller 
                                                 
16 As expected, counties with higher average incomes have more SUS doctors, nurses and clinics per capita.  
This effect is large: a one standard deviation increase in per capita income increases doctors and nurses per 
capita by about 11% and clinic rooms per capita by 7%. 
17 We find this effect after controlling for other variables that may also proxy the share of uninsured in the 
population, such as the % of population living in slums and the % of population voting for leftist 
candidates.  In the more parsimonious specifications (i.e. models 2 and 3), the impact of the Gini 
coefficient is even larger.  A one standard deviation increase in the Gini increases doctors by about 6 - 7%.   28
once we control for the illiteracy rate and the spatial correlation in errors.
18  The illiteracy 
rate itself has large negative impacts (of -5% to -18% for a one standard deviation 
increase) on the allocation of health inputs and changes in health budgets. 
Third, our proxies for political leverage in negotiations with higher levels of 
government are often significant and increase the level of public health inputs.  The 
higher the winner’s share of the vote in the 1996 county mayoral elections, the stronger 
the mayor’s power in negotiating transfers from federal and state governments.  A one 
standard deviation (or 8.9 percentage point) increase in the mayor’s vote share increases 
clinics and clinic rooms by over 15% and increases doctors and nurses by about 6% and 
3% respectively.  This effect is statistically significant for all four inputs.  It is possible 
that the mayor’s popularity is influenced by the quality health services he has delivered in 
the past.  However, we also find that counties where the mayor won a one standard 
deviation larger share of the vote in the 1996 elections experienced an 11.5% larger 
increase in their health budget between 1995 and 2000.  This makes it unlikely that the 
reverse causality drives this result entirely.  Consistent with these results, Finan (2003) 
reports that federal deputies in Brazil reward counties where they win larger vote shares 
by making greater public investments in those areas.     
The fact that the county mayor and state governor are of the same party may also 
increase the county’s leverage in negotiations with the state.  This holds in the equations 
for doctors and nurses, and increases the provision of doctors by 27% and nurses by 33% 
at their respective sample means.  These results are in line with a more descriptive study 
by Lima (2002), who finds that total federal transfers to states for all purposes are 
                                                 
18 In the model with spatial autocorrelation in errors, we do find strong evidence of positive autocorrelation 
with respect to geographic neighbors.  This reduces statistical significance for covariates which themselves 
follow a spatial pattern (e.g. voting rates, see figure 1).    29
significantly larger in Brazilian states that are politically aligned with the federal 
government.  We hypothesized that the benefits of being a popular mayor would increase 
if the state governor were of the same political party; however, the results for this 
interaction effect (which should be positive in sign) are mixed.  This is also true for 
Distance to the State Capital, which, as expected, is negative for doctors, clinics and 
consultation rooms, but positive in the case of nurses. 
Finally, decentralization in the administration of health care services has an 
ambiguous effect on the level of public health care services.  There is no evidence that 
decentralized counties provide higher levels of public health services than state-run 
counties, but they do experience significantly larger increases in their health budgets after 
the 1996 elections.  Once the set of decentralized counties is subdivided into two 
groups—those that have a governance plan and those that do not—some interesting 
results emerge.  For each of the four inputs, the coefficient on the indicator for 
decentralized counties with a plan for governance is more positive than the coefficient on 
the indicator for decentralized counties without a governance plan.  Further, in the 
doctors and nurses regressions, the former is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that decentralized counties with the required governing capacity have 11% 
more doctors and 18% more nurses than counties that are not decentralized.  In the 
sample of urbanized areas, we find that within the set of decentralized counties, those 
with a governance plan provide 3.4% more doctors than those without.  Thus, 
decentralization seems to increase health inputs only if it is accompanied by good local 
governance.   30
Our strongest results with respect to decentralization come from the model of 
changes in the county health budgets between 1995 and 2000 (model 10 in table 4).  
Decentralized counties experience about 75% larger increases in their health budgets than 
state-run counties over this time period.  Additionally, this effect is significantly larger 
for decentralized counties with a governance plan. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In Brazil the role of decentralization in the provision of health care has both an 
administrative aspect (it affects the targeting of services to the poor) and a fiscal one (it 
affects county budgets).  Data from the 1998 PNAD survey suggest that more SUS 
doctors, nurses and clinic rooms in a county increase the chances that an uninsured 
person receives medical attention when ill.  Decentralization of service delivery actually 
reduces the chances of receiving health care if it is not accompanied by good governing 
capacity.  It also appears from our analyses that decentralization, when accompanied by 
good governance, increases the amount of public health services provided in a county.
19  
Our results on decentralization conditional on good governance are consistent with 
Bardhan and Mookherjee’s (1998) theoretical proposition that the impact of 
decentralization on service delivery depends on the relative degree of capture that local 
versus national governments are prone to.   
In explaining variation in the level of SUS doctors, nurses and clinics across 
counties our models suggest that the preferences of voters matter. Counties with a higher 
proportion of voters who are likely to rely on the SUS system have more SUS doctors, 
                                                 
19 Faguet (2004) finds a similar result in Bolivia.  He examines patterns of government investment by sector 
following the transfer of authority to county governments and finds that more investment occurs in counties 
that need it most (e.g., there is more investment in education in counties with greater illiteracy).   31
nurses and clinics.  This is consistent with the results of Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) 
who find that districts in India with a higher proportion of poor voters receive more pro-
poor public goods. We also find that political participation matters—counties with a 
higher proportion of people voting in the 1996 mayoral election have more SUS 
services—a finding consistent with Besley and Burgess (2003), Stromberg (2004) and 
Betancourt and Gleason (2000).  In our data, greater political participation rates 
correspond to larger voting rates for the poor and uninsured who demand these health 
services.  Similar to our findings, Banerjee (2002) reports in a review paper that 
politically “disempowered” groups lack access to public services in India.  Political 
variables that proxy the power of the county mayor—his share of the vote in the mayoral 
election; whether he is of the same party as the state governor—also tend to be positively 
related to provision of SUS health services.  Generally, the impacts of politics on health 
service delivery that we document for Brazil echo other researchers’ findings on India, 
another large developing country that has been studied more frequently by development 
economists.   
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Figure 1.  Spatial Patterns in the County Data 
 
Key: Darker colors imply more health services 
 
 

















Data Appendix  
 
A. Data Sources for County Level Variables 
 
Data on the number of doctors (including specialists), nurses, clinics and clinic 
consultation rooms (SUS as well as non-SUS) came from the Pesquisa Assistencia 
Medico-Sanitaria, a survey of all health facilities in Brazil conducted in 1998-99.  For 
county-level GDP data, we rely on estimates for the year 1996 constructed by IPEA 
(2001) on the basis of the Censuses of Population, Industry, Agriculture and Services.  
These censuses are administered by the Brazilian national statistical institute (IBGE).
20 
 
The proportion of ‘white’ and ‘indigenous’ in the population and the Gini 
coefficient measure of income inequality were computed using data from the 1991 
Demographic Census.  Data on the proportion of residents living in temporary housing or 
slum areas, proportion urban and population density are from the Base do Informações 
Municipais (BIM) 1996 produced by IBGE.  The distance from each county to the state 
capital was computed from latitude and longitude coordinates for the “center” of each 
county also taken from BIM. It was assumed that each degree of latitude or longitude 
spans the same length of about 110 km. This is approximately correct for Brazil where all 
points are located less than 20 degrees from the Equator, although the exact 
correspondence between a degree of longitude or latitude and distance in kilometers 
differs slightly at different geographical locations (Meeus 1999).   
 
Our measures of governance are taken from a survey of all counties conducted in 
1999 by IBGE (Pesquisa de Informações Basicas Municipais). The decentralization 
dummy variable is calculated based on which counties have Full County Management 
status in 1998, as reported by SUS.  All political variables were computed from the 
database maintained by Brazil’s Superior Election Court (TSE).  This database reports 
the names and characteristics of all candidates running for office, and the number of 
votes received by each candidate in each county for Presidential, state gubernatorial and 
county mayoral elections held since 1992.  Elections are held at four-year intervals, and 
county elections are staggered by two years (1992, 1996, 2000) relative to state and 
federal elections (1994, 1998).  Constrained by the years for which health data are 
available, we concentrate on the 1994 and 1996 elections. 
 
Our political participation variable is calculated as the number of votes cast in the 
1996 mayoral elections (excluding null and blank votes) in each county, as a fraction of 
the county population.  We chose to normalize by population rather than by the number 
of registered voters, because the former definition gives us a more accurate measure of 
voting rates among those (the poor, uninsured who are more likely to not be employed in 
the formal sector) who would benefit from public health services. 
 
                                                 
20 The geographic boundaries of some counties do not stay constant over time. We normalize all relevant 




B. Details on the PNAD Individual and Household Survey Variables 
 
The Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD) is a household and 
individual survey conducted almost every year, representative for all of Brazil except for 
sparsely populated rural areas in the Northern states of Rondonia, Acre, Amazonas, 
Roraima, Para and Amapa.  PNAD is a stratified sample, where included counties are 
divided into two groups: key counties (including those in the large urban areas) and 
second-tier ones. Households in each of the key counties are sampled, while a subset of 
second-tier counties are selected by stratification. The 1998 PNAD included households 
from 793 out of a total of 5008 Brazilian counties.  
 
The 1998 PNAD consists of a basic questionnaire and an additional health module 
which asked detailed questions about health status and usage of health services.  A total 
of 112,434 households (344,886 individuals) were surveyed in PNAD 1998.  Our 
regression sample consists of a subset of those individuals, selected (as explained below) 
on the basis of their healthcare needs over a two-week recall.  
 
C. Measuring Individual Access to Health Care 
 
Figure A.1 below outlines the process for constructing the individual health-
access variable based on the 1998 PNAD survey questions.  The following survey 
questions were used to create this variable: 
 
(1) “During the past 2 weeks, have you looked for any health service or 
professional for treatment related to your own health?” (Yes/No). 
 
Individuals who responded “yes” to the question above were then asked:   
 
(2) “When you looked for this treatment, were you treated?” (Yes/No). 
 
Individual who responded “no” to question 2 were asked: 
 
(3) “… why not?”   
 
The possible multiple choice responses for question 3 were: (a) there was no available 
vacancy; (b) there was no attending doctor; (c) the required service or specialized 
professional was not available; (d) the required equipment was out of order; (e) could not 
afford payment;
21 (f) waited too long and gave up; and (g) other reasons. 
 
Those who answered “no” to question (1) (i.e. did not seek healthcare over the 
two-week recall) were also asked: 
 
                                                 
21 Multiple choice options relating to payment for services - (e) for Question 3 and (b) for Question 4 – 
were provided because: (i) the survey includes potential users of non-SUS facilities where services are not 
free of charge, (ii) SUS may have to pay for prescription drugs out-of-pocket; and (iii) users may have to 
pay for their own transport to the health facilities.  
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(4) “During the past 2 weeks, why did you not look for health services?” 
 
Possible responses were: (a) it was not necessary; (b) did not have money; (c) the health 
facility is far away or access is difficult; (d) there were difficulties with transportation; (e) 
very long waiting time; (f) the necessary specialist was not available at the health facility; 
(g) nobody was available to accompany you; (h) other reasons; (i) unknown. 
 
Those who answered (a) to question 4 (286,885) were dropped from the analysis 
because they did not require health services. Those responding with (h) and (i) were also 
dropped, since these responses do not provide adequate information for us to judge their 
health care access status.  Among the remaining respondents (53,584, i.e. all respondents 
aside from those dropped), the following were classified as not having adequate health 
care access:  
 
-   Those who answered “No” to question 2 (i.e. those who were not treated when 
they sought healthcare, totaling 1800 individuals), and  
-  Those responding with (b), (c), (e) or (f) to question 3 (i.e. individuals who did 
not bother seeking care due to difficulties in access, totaling 7,985).  
 
All remaining individuals (43,799) were classified as having adequate health care 
access. All individuals with private health insurance were dropped from the analysis.  
This – as well as exclusion of persons with missing or inadequate responses for other 
survey questions or missing county information – resulted in the final sample of 25,464 
individuals classified as having health care access, and 8,077 persons (24.1%) classified 
as not having it.  
 




344,886 Individuals in PNAD 
Had a Health Problem that 
Required Medical Attention 
Sought Health-care 
Did Not Seek Health-care














(7,985) Table 1. Summary Statistics - County Level Variables
Variables
Mean     
(Std. Dev.)
Range Mean     
(Std. Dev.)
Range Mean     
(Std. Dev.)
Range Mean     
(Std. Dev.)
Range
0.972 1.225 1.043 1.181
(0.954) (0.979) (0.665) (0.916)
1.358 2.097 1.807 2.027
(1.114) (1.534) (1.409) (1.51)
0.345
(0.26)
2.34 1.317 1.29 1.311





























0.054 0.121 0.129 0.123
(0.226) (0.326) (0.335) (0.328)
0.042 0.193 0.153 0.183
(0.2) (0.395) (0.36) (0.387)
0.342 0.547 0.49 0.533
(0.474) (0.498) (0.5) (0.499)
0.098 1.327 1.016 1.252
(0.526) (2.161) (1.891) (2.104)
0.587 0.796 0.727 0.78
(0.224) (0.221) (0.249) (0.23)
0.041 0.369 0.291 0.35







Change in County Health Budget per-capita 
1995-2000




All Individuals         
(33541 Obs.)
Individuals Without 
Health Access         
(8077 Obs.)
County Sample         
(4338 Obs.)
Individuals With Health 
Access               
(25464 Obs.)
(0-2.49)
Public Doctors and Specialists per Thousand 
People
Private Doctors and Specialists per 
Thousand People
Public Nurses per Thousand People
Private Nurses per Thousand People
Public Clinic Consultation Rooms per 1000 
people
Private Clinic Consultation Rooms per 1000 
people
Public Clinics per 1000 people
% of County Population Living in Urban 
Areas
Dummy for Major Metropolitan Region
Decentralized Counties (Healthcare County-
Run) Without a Governance Plan
Decentralized Counties (Healthcare County-
Run) With a Governance Plan
Indicator for Counties with a Governance 
Plan
Population Density
Winner's Vote Share in 1996 Mayoral 
Election (Popularity of Elected Mayor)
Counties Where the State Governor and 
County Mayor are from the Same Party
Interaction: (Mayor's Vote Share) * (Mayor 
and Governor from Same Party)
Distance to the State Capital
Proportion of County Population that is 
White
Proportion of County Population that is 
Indigenous
Political Participation in 1996 Mayoral 
Election
Proportion of the County Population that is 
Illiterate
County GDP per Capita (logged)
Gini Coefficient of Income
Share of 1998 Presidential Election Votes 
Cast for a Left-Leaning Candidate





(0-1) (0-1) (0-1) (0-1)
(0.02-1) (0.1-1) (0.1-1) (0.1-1)
(0-12.41) (0-12.41) (0-12.41) (0-12.41)
(0-1) (0-1) (0-1) (0-1)
(0-1) (0-1) (0-1) (0-1)













(0-13.02) (0-8.8) (0-8.8) (0-8.8)
(0-2.67)
(0-16.81) (0-7.18) (0-7.18) (0-7.18)
(0-21.55) (0-21.55) (0-21.55) (0-21.55)
38Table 1. (cont.) Summary Statistics - Individual Level Variables
Variables
Mean     
(Std. Dev.)
Range Mean     
(Std. Dev.)
Range Mean     
(Std. Dev.)





















































County Sample         
(4338 Obs.)
Individuals With Health 
Access               
(25464 Obs.)
Individuals Without 
Health Access         
(8077 Obs.)
All Individuals         
(33541 Obs.)
Indicator for Respondents with Diabetes
Indicator for Respondents with Chronic 
Kidney Disease
Access to Health Care
Respondent could not Engage in Usual 
Activities due to Heart/Blood Pressure Prob
Respondent could not Engage in Usual 
Activities due to Mental/Emotional Prob.
Indicator for Respondents with Back 
Problems
Indicator for Respondents with Arthritis or 
Rheumatism
Respondent could not Engage in Usual 
Activities due to Diarrhoea/Vomiting
Interaction of Age and Preceding Diarrhoea 
Variable
Respondent could not Engage in Usual 
Activities due to Respiratory Illness




Household Resides in Urban Area
No. of Days Respondent could not Engage 
in Usual Activities due to Illness
Highest Level of Education Completed by 
Respondent is Secondary
Highest Level of Education Completed by 
Respondent is Tertiary
Respondent is Black
Respondent is Colored (but not Oriental or 
Indigenous)
Respondent's Age Squared / 100
No. of Household Inhabitants Aged 9 or less
No. of Household Inhabitants Aged 10 
Years or More
Highest Level of Education Completed by 
Respondent is Primary



























39Table 2. Access to Health-Care Regressions
Individual/Household Controls (1) ME

















































(2.62) Prob > Chi-square 0.04
Observations
Heteroskedasticity-corrected z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%


















s Indicator for Respondents with Back 
Problems
Indicator for Respondents with Arthritis or 
Rheumatism
Indicator for Respondents with Diabetes

























No. of Days Respondent could not Engage 
in Usual Activities due to Illness
Respondent could not Engage in Usual 
Activities due to Diarrhoea/Vomiting
Interaction of Age and Preceding Diarrhoea 
Variable
Respondent could not Engage in Usual 
Activities due to Respiratory Illness
Interaction of Age and Preceding 
Respiratory Illness Variable
Respondent could not Engage in Usual 
Activities due to Heart/Blood Pressure Prob
Respondent could not Engage in Usual 
Activities due to Mental/Emotional Prob.
Respondent is Colored (but not Oriental or 
Indigenous)
Respondent is Indigenous
Household Per Capita Monthly Income 
(logged)









































Indicator for Female Respondent
Respondent's Age
Respondent's Age Squared / 100
No. of Household Inhabitants Aged 9 or less
No. of Household Inhabitants Aged 10 
Years or More
Highest Level of Education Completed by 
Respondent is Primary
Highest Level of Education Completed by 
Respondent is Secondary
Highest Level of Education Completed by 
Respondent is Tertiary
Respondent is Black
Decentralized Counties Without a 
Governance Plan
Decentralized Counties With a 
Governance Plan
Public Doctors and Specialists per 
Thousand People
Private Doctors and Specialists per 
Thousand People
Public Nurses per Thousand 
People














































































Indicator for Counties with a 
Governance Plan
Population Density
% of County Population Living in 
Urban Areas
Dummy for Major Metropolitan 
Region
Public Clinic Consultation Rooms 
per 1000 people
Private Clinic Consultation Rooms 
per 1000 people
0.027
aMarginal Effect: increase in probability that the individual reports that s/he has access to health-care in 


































40Table 3. County-Level Regressions of Public Doctors per Thousand People





0.237*** 0.202*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133***
(10.82) (8.97) (5.59) (4.48) (4.01)
1.073*** 0.978*** 0.599*** 0.579** 1.084***
(6.63) (5.94) (3.48) (2.43) (3.96)
0.478*** 0.245* 0.178 0.120







0.660*** 0.678*** 0.303* 0.290 0.272
(4.27) (4.45) (1.95) (1.38) (1.21)
-0.970*** -1.013*** -1.118***
(7.11) (4.9) (4.88)
0.419** 0.671*** 0.736*** 0.701*** 0.559**
(2.39) (3.38) (3.77) (3.67) (2.48)
0.296*** 0.264*** 0.305** 0.351***
(3.14) (2.85) (2.3) (3.07)
-0.763** -0.654* -0.75* -0.767*
(2.01) (1.72) (1.76) (1.68)
-0.018** -0.015 -0.007
(2.03) (1.27) (0.48)
0.034 -0.009 0.005 -0.077
(0.62) (0.17) (0.07) (1.18)
0.161*** 0.104* 0.124* 0.080
(2.80) (1.74) (1.74) (1.23)
-0.009 -0.016 -0.021 -0.019







-2.736*** -2.644*** -1.268*** -1.175* -0.793*
(6.08) (6.09) (3.25) (1.85) (1.87)
0.185***
(18.17)
Observations 4338 4338 4338 4338 2708
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.18
F-stat for Equality of Decentralization 
[with/without governance plan] Coefficients
3.02 2.47 3.80
Prob > F 0.08 0.12 0.05
Heterskedasticity-corrected t statistics in parentheses; State Dummies included in all Specifications
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Full Sample - OLS




















































Proportion of County Population that is White
Proportion of County Population that is 
Indigenous





















Proportion of the County Population that is 
Illiterate
County GDP per Capita (logged)
Gini Coefficient of Income
Share of 1998 Presidential Election Votes Cast 
for a Left-Leaning Candidate
% of Population Living in Slums (Improvised 
Housing)
Constant
Decentralized Counties (Healthcare County-
Run) Without a Governance Plan
Decentralized Counties (Healthcare County-
Run) With a Governance Plan

















































% of County Population Living in Urban Areas
































Winner's Vote Share in 1996 Mayoral Election 
(Popularity of Elected Mayor)
Counties Where the State Governor and 
County Mayor are from the Same Party
Interaction: (Mayor's Vote Share) * (Mayor 
and Governor from Same Party)
Distance to the State Capital
41Table 4. OLS Regressions of Health Service Provision per Thousand People







0.173*** 0.019** 0.194*** 9.974***
(5.39) (2.38) (4.51) (5.88)
1.025*** 0.041 0.717** -35.086***
(3.87) (0.61) (2.11) (2.81)
0.453*** 0.097*** 0.117 -11.250
(2.87) (2.60) (0.58) (1.63)
-1.474* 0.013 2.078 75.838
(1.70) (0.06) (1.51) (1.38)
-0.186* -0.065** -0.312* -6.680
(1.67) (2.26) (1.96) (1.25)
0.423 0.446* 2.442*** 33.113
(0.63) (1.84) (2.68) (1.00)
0.009 0.355*** 2.234*** 45.513***
(0.03) (5.79) (6.94) (3.97)
-1.065*** -0.139** -0.703*** -19.167**
(5.03) (2.54) (2.66) (2.01)
0.443* 0.603*** 5.135*** 64.280***
(1.83) (10.33) (14.84) (5.92)
0.452*** -0.056 -0.285 -10.126
(2.82) (1.43) (0.93) (1.40)
-1.349*** 0.212 1.209 35.550
(2.58) (1.50) (1.08) (1.41)
0.028** -0.010*** -0.018 1.475***
(2.54) (3.69) (1.35) (2.66)
0.100 -0.028** -0.204*** 32.328***
(1.39) (2.33) (2.92) (7.99)
0.242** -0.018 -0.165* 42.726***
(2.55) (1.33) (1.95) (8.14)
0.066* -0.019** -0.080* 1.317
(1.76) (2.39) (1.90) (0.90)
0.021 -0.016*** -0.174*** -0.470
(0.46) (3.59) (5.11) (0.27)
0.285*** -0.314*** -0.763*** -2.294
(3.08) (13.52) (5.97) (0.58)
-0.271*** -0.067*** -0.386*** -5.369
(2.60) (4.93) (4.24) (1.18)
-0.187***
(3.31)
-0.780 -0.287 -3.516** -60.323***
(0.80) (1.46) (2.54) (2.82)
Observations 4338 4338 4338 3668
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.26 0.30 0.13
F-stat for Equality of Decentralization 
[with/without governance plan] Coefficients
1.66 0.33 0.15 2.78
Prob > F 0.20 0.56 0.70 0.10
Heterskedasticity-corrected t statistics in parentheses; State Dummies included in all Specifications
















































% of County Population Living in Urban Areas
































Winner's Vote Share in 1996 Mayoral Election 
(Popularity of Elected Mayor)
Counties Where the State Governor and County 
Mayor are from the Same Party
Interaction: (Mayor's Vote Share) * (Mayor and 
Governor from Same Party)
Distance to the State Capital
Constant
Decentralized Counties (Healthcare County-
Run) Without a Governance Plan
Decentralized Counties (Healthcare County-
Run) With a Governance Plan
Indicator for Counties with a Governance Plan
Population Density





















































Proportion of County Population that is White
Proportion of County Population that is 
Indigenous




















Proportion of the County Population that is 
Illiterate
County GDP per Capita (logged)
Gini Coefficient of Income
Share of 1998 Presidential Election Votes Cast 
for a Left-Leaning Candidate
% of Population Living in Slums (Improvised 
Housing)


















































Observations 4190 4190 4338
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.29 0.72
F-stat for equality of Decentralization 
[with/without governance plan] coefficients
1.54 2.38
Prob > F 0.22 0.12
Heterskedasticity-corrected t statistics in parentheses; State Dummies included in all Specifications
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
County GDP per Capita (logged)
Gini Coefficient of Income
Share of 1998 Presidential Election Votes Cast 
for a Left-Leaning Candidate
% of Population Living in Slums (Improvised 
Housing)
Proportion of Municipal Population that is 
White
Proportion of Municipal Population that is 
Indigenous
Political Participation in 1996 Mayoral Election
Proportion of the Municipal Population that is 
Illiterate
Indicator for Municipios with a Governance 
Plan
Population Density
Winner's Vote Share in 1996 Mayoral Election 
(Popularity of Elected Mayor)
Municipios Where the State Governor and 
Municipio Mayor are from the Same Party
Interaction: (Mayor's Vote Share) * (Mayor and 
Governor from Same Party)
Distance to the State Capital
Federal per-capita SUS 
transfers to County (logged)
Density of Voting Locations
Proportion of Votes Cast that were Null or 
Blank
Constant
% of Municipio Population Living in Urban 
Areas
Dummy for Major Metropolitan Region
Proportion of Population with between 5 and 11 
Years of Schooling
Proportion of Population with 12 or more Years 
of Schooling
Decentralized Municipios (Healthcare 
Municipio-Run) Without a Governance Plan
Decentralized Municipios (Healthcare 
Municipio-Run) With a Governance Plan
43